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The concept of a court for juveniles only has experienced both vast
popularity and general disrepute. Beginning with the juvenile court
statute adopted in Illinois in 1899, juvenile court was established in all
fifty states.t The reformers who created it were appalled "that children
could be given long prison sentences and mixed in jails with hardened
criminals."'2 Rather, the children were to be "treated" and "rehabili-
tated" by procedures that were "clinical" and not punitive.3 With the
state proceeding as parenspatriae, not as prosecutor, the judge dealt
with problems of "erring children" as a "wise and kind father."' 4 Child
offenders were not treated as criminals, but "as misdirected and mis-
guided and needing aid, encouragement, help and assistance." 5
Though the Illinois statute of 1899 provided minors with a right to
trial by jury,6 legal procedure was seldom considered appropriate in
Illinois or elsewhere. Featured as a rehabilitative clinic separate from
harsh criminal court procedure and sentencing, juvenile court paid lit-
tle attention to formality. As the goal was adjustment of erring chil-
dren by a kindly judge, appointment of attorneys, formal notice of
charges, and a laborious adjudicatory process were out of place. Be-
cause of the overriding rehabilitative theme,7 removal of children from
their parents and placement in the Department of Corrections were
seen merely as necessary clinical techniques in the best interests of the
minors. Procedures involving the future of juveniles became summary
and represented less than the best efforts of the clinician.
* Juvenile court judge, Lake County, Illinois; B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., North-
western University Law School.
1. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967).
2. Id at 15.
3. Id. at 16.
4. People ex rel. Houghland v. Leonard, 415 Ill. 135, 139, 112 N.E.2d 697, 699 (1953).
5. Id. at 139-40, 112 N.E.2d at 700.
6. People ex ret Carey v. White, 65 111. 2d 193, 199, 357 N.E.2d 512, 514 (1976).
7. See, e.g., People v. Woodruff, 88 IUI. 2d 10, 430 N.E.2d 1120 (1981); In re Armour, 59 Ill.
2d 102, 319 N.E.2d 496 (1974); People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Felt, 48 Ill 2d 171, 269 N.E.2d 1 (1971);
People ex rel. Houghland v. Leonard, 415 111. 135, 112 N.E.2d 697 (1953); City of Chicago v.
County of Cook, 106 Ill. App. 47 (1st Dist. 1903).
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The euphoria of the wholesome separateness of juvenile court was
interrupted by Kent v. United States8 and In re Gault.9 In Kent, Justice
Fortas made this sobering observation: "There is evidence, in fact, that
there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of
both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor
the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
children."' 0
In Gault, criticism of the juvenile court system reached a cres-
cendo. Justice Fortas, speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court, com-
pared juvenile court to the Star Chamber, whose powers "were a trifle
in comparison."' I He stated, "[T]he constitutional and theoretical basis
for this peculiar system is - to say the least - debatable."' 2 Justice For-
tas noted that one half of juvenile judges had no undergraduate degrees
and only 213 of 2,987 were full time judges.' 3 The Gault Court ex-
pressed rancor and disdain: "Under our Constitution, the condition of
being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court."' 4
In a subsequent case, Justice Douglas concluded that juvenile
court practice fell short of its professed goals:
[T]he love and tenderness alone, possessed by the white-coated judge
and attendants, were not sufficient to untangle the web of subcon-
scious influences that possessed the troubled youngster ...
[C]orrectional institutions designed to care for these delinquents
often became miniature prisons with many of the same vicious as-
pects as the adult models . . . . [T]he secrecy of the juvenile pro-
8. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). The Kent case concerned a sixteen year old charged with house-
breaking, robbery and rape. The applicable District of Columbia Juvenile Court Act permitted
the juvenile judge, in cases of specified crimes, to waive juvenile court jurisdiction and transfer the
case to adult court. Waiver was only permitted after "full investigation." In Kent's case the maxi-
mum sentence in juvenile court would have been detention for five years; the maximum sentence
in adult court was death. The Supreme Court found the juvenile judge's waiver, which was made
without hearing, without affording the minor effective assistance of counsel, and without a state-
ment of reasons, to be violative of the boy's constitutional rights under the District of Columbia
statute. Id at 553-57.
9. 387 U.S. I (1967). For discussions of Kent and Gault, see, e.g., Cohen, The Standard of
Proof in Juvenile Proceeding. Gault Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 567 (1970);
Davidson, In re Gault: The Juvenile's Gideon, 56 ILL. B.J. 488 (1968); Schorrhorst, The Waiver of
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: Kent Revisited, 43 IND. L.J. 583 (1968); Croxton, The Kent Case and lts
Consequence, 7 J. FAM. L. 1 (1967).
10. 383 U.S. at 556.
11. 387 U.S. at 18 (quoting Dean Pound who was comparing the power of juvenile courts
with that of the Star Chamber).
12. Id at 17.
13. Id. at 14, n.14.
14. Id at 28. The Gault case concerned the adjudication of "delinquency" of Gerald Gault,
then fifteen, who had been charged with making lewd telephone calls. There were procedural
questions regarding notice, right to counsel, right to confront witnesses, fifth amendment privi-
leges, right to a transcript of the proceedings and the right to appellate review. Id at 10.
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ceedings led to some overreaching and arbitrary actions.' 5
Fortunately for the juvenile court process, Gault stopped short of
absolute condemnation and limited its holding to requiring certain due
process rights in juvenile court. Gault held that the juvenile is entitled
to proper notice and formal presentation of charges to enable him to
defend himself.16 The Court found the minor would be entitled to
rights he would enjoy if an adult:
He would be entitled to clear advice that he could be represented by
counsel, and, at least if a felony were involved, the State would be
required to provide counsel if his parents were unable to afford it. If
the court acted on the basis of his confession, careful procedures
would be required to assure its voluntariness. If the case went to
trial, confrontation and the opportunity for cross-examination would
be guaranteed. 17
Gault also held that in light of possible "loss of his liberty,"' 8 the
juvenile is guaranteed his fifth amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion.' 9 Gault merely mentioned, but did not rule upon, basic areas of
juvenile court practice: "[I]t has been held that the juvenile is not enti-
tled to bail, to indictment by grand jury, to a public trial or to trial by
jury."20
These and other areas have been resolved to some extent by post-
Gault decisions that have shaped due process rights of minors in juve-
nile court. There has been no plenary commitment to "all of the proce-
dural requirements of the Constitution and Bill of Rights," 21 as favored
by Justice Douglas. The issues appear to have been considered indi-
vidually and the results have been mixed.
In Illinois, the proceedings remain closed to the general public. 22
There continues to be no jury box, although the juvenile judge might
15. DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
16. 387 U.S. at 33-34.
17. Id. at 29.
18. ld at 36.
19. Id at 55.
20. Id at 14.
21. 396 U.S. at 38. There has been discussion of the topic among legal scholars. For a com-
mentary urging consideration of full procedural due process protections for juveniles, see Note,
Juvenile Justice: Procedural Safeguards for Delinquents at the Adudicatory Stage-Notfor Adults
Only, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 288 (1982). For a discussion of the need to extend due process rights of
juveniles to include the right to independent legal representation in juvenile court, see Note, The
Representation ofAJuveniles Before the Court: A Look Into the Past and the Future, 31 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 580 (1981). For a commentary specifically urging full fourth amendment rights for
minors against unreasonable search and seizure, see, Note, Fourth Amendment Protectionfor the
Juvenile Offender. State, Parent, and the Best Interests ofthe Minor, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 1140
(1981).
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-20(6) (1981).
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move to a court that has one to try a Habitual Juvenile Offender 23 case.
The considerations of a detention hearing still vary from adult court
bond procedure. The more paternal and less harsh sounding language
of juvenile court remains intact: "admissions" are still taken in place of
"pleas;" "adjudicatory hearings" are held in place of "trials;" and "dis-
positions" are made in place of "sentences." Though still an ongoing
experiment of law, social science and common sense, the post-Gault
juvenile court has undergone significant changes in its structure, proce-
dures and focus. In the fifteen years since the Gault decision, juvenile
court has become a hybrid between constitutional court and social
clinic.
This article will survey the present status of procedural due pro-
cess rights of juveniles in Illinois courts. Federal decisions will be
noted where appropriate, and reference will be made to both Illinois
statutes and case law.
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF JUVENILES IN ILLINOIS COURTS
Right to Bail
The United States Supreme Court has not ruled upon juveniles'
entitlement to bail under the due process clause.
Illinois follows the majority rule24 that a juvenile has no constitu-
tional right to bail pending adjudicatory hearing. In United States ex
rel Burton v. Coughlin,25 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the dismissal of a juvenile's request for a writ of habeas corpus.
The court stated that there was no need to consider the constitutional
question since the Illinois Juvenile Court Act provides an adequate
substitute for bail.2 6 The Illinois Appellate Court, citing the Burton
decision, stated in dictum in In re Beasley,27 "A minor does not have
the right to release on recognizance or bail pending a delinquency
adjudication." 28
In a supervisory order, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled bail is
available to the minor pending appeal. In In re Pulido,29 the court
found controlling that there is no statute providing that the Supreme
23. Id at § 705-12.
24. See Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 848 (1973).
25. 463 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1972).
26. Id at 532.
27. 35 Ill. App. 3d 816, 342 N.E.2d 803 (lst Dist. 1976), aff'd, 66 Ill. 2d 385, 362 N.E.2d 1024
(1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1016 (1978).
28. Id at 820, 342 N.E.2d at 806. For a discussion of Illinois minors' right to bail, see Note,
Right to Bailfor Juveniles, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 99 (1971).
29. 69 Il1. 2d 393, 372 N.E.2d 822 (1978).
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Court Rule granting adults bond on appeal is inapplicable in juvenile
cases.
Regarding the question of release of juveniles pending adjudica-
tory hearing, Chapter 37 of the Illinois Revised Statutes provides a spe-
cific procedure. 30 A minor may be released by a detention officer of the
juvenile court and return to court at a time designated by the officer. If
the minor is detained, he must be taken before a judicial officer within
thirty-six hours, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays or designated holi-
days. The court can order continued detention only if it finds that there
is probable cause that the minor is a delinquent as defined in Section
702-2 and that there is immediate and urgent necessity that he be de-
tained. 3' Section 703-6 states: "If the court finds that it is a matter of
immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of the minor or the
person or property of another that the minor be detained or. . .that he
is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court, it may prescribe deten-
tion. .... -32 The statute provides that the adjudicatory hearing must
be set within ten court days from the date of the order of detention on
an original petition 33 and fifteen court days on a revocation petition.34
Failure to bring the minor to adjudicatory hearing within statutory
time requires release from detention, but not dismissal of the delin-
quency petition. 35
Section 703-6 presents a separate and distinct statute from section
110-1 to -17 of chapter 38 of the Illinois Revised Statutes pertaining to
bail for adults. Thus, as there is a contrary juvenile procedure pro-
vided by statute, the Pulido rationale would appear inapplicable to the
release of juveniles on bond pending adjudicatory hearing.
In People v. Woodruff,36 the supreme court commented on the de-
tention statute without ruling upon its constitutionality. The court
30. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 703-4 (1981).
31. Id
32. Id at § 703-6(2).
33. Id at § 704-2.
34. Id at § 705-3(4).
35. People v. Clayborn, 90 111. App. 3d 1047, 414 N.E.2d 157 (1st Dist. 1980); People v. Dean,
52 I11. App. 3d 383, 367 N.E.2d 419 (5th Dist. 1977). In Dean, the statute required a hearing
within fifteen days to determine revocation of probation. The juvenile was detained from Novem-
ber 13 until December 8 and hearing was not held until the following January 12. Id. at 384, 367
N.E.2d at 420. The appellate court found violation of the rule was not jurisdictional and did not
require dismissal. Id at 385, 367 N.E.2d at 421-22.
In Clayborn, the statute required a hearing within 36 hours to justify detention. The juvenile
was taken into custody at about 2:00 p.m. on May 30. A probable cause hearing was not held until
about 11:20 a.m. on June 3. Id at 1048-49, 414 N.E.2d at 159. The appellate court found the
thirty-six hour rule not merely directory, but mandatory. Id. at 1050, 414 N.E.2d at 160.
36. 88 Ill. 2d 10, 430 N.E.2d 1120 (1981). The court held time spent in juvenile detention is
not included for purposes of the running of the statutory period of 120 days within which the
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noted that the statute "permits a juvenile offender to be detained only
upon specific findings of the court, and strict time limitations are im-
posed. . . ."37 The Illinois Supreme Court recently stated agreement
with prior appellate decisions: "We conclude that Section 4-2 estab-
lishes a maximum period of time that a minor can be detained pending
judicial action on the merits of his case. Section 4-2 mandates not dis-
charge, but release when the statutory period has been exceeded. '38
Under the Illinois Revised Statutes, an adult may not be held
without bond simply because he presents a threat to another person or
another person's property, or that he would likely flee the jurisdiction.
Those considerations, which foreclose the release of the minor, are




The United States Supreme Court held in In re Winship :40 "In
sum, the constitutional safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is as much required during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency pro-
ceeding as are those constitutional safeguards applied in Gault-notice
of charges, right to counsel, rights of confrontation and examination,
and the privilege against self-incrimination. '41
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to prove an
original delinquency petition has been the law in Illinois since In re
Urbasek ,42 decided three years before Winshop. Though the Illinois
Supreme Court considered in Urbasek that juvenile court procedure
was "not penal but protective, '43 the court found that Gault creates "a
spirit that transcends the specific issues there involved." 44 The court
defendant (here the minor who was transferred to adult court) must be brought to trial. Id at 15,
430 N.E.2d at 1125.
37. Id at 19, 430 N.E.2d at 1124.
38. People exrel Davis v. Vasquez, 92 Ill. 2d 132, 145, 441 N.E. 2d 54, 59 (1982). In Vasquez,
the supreme court ruled, "[W]e hold that minors detained on a charge of delinquency have the
right to bail when the State appeals an order of the juvenile court denying a motion to prosecute
them as adults." Id. at 152, 441 N.E.2d at 62. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Simon asserted that
the statute required release rather than bail which could result in further detention. "[A] juvenile
who is being confined is entitled to release pending his adjudicatory hearing, if the hearing is not
held within the specified period. . .The majority concedes that under normal circumstances this
is true, but finds an exception in this case." Id at 153, 441 N.E. 2d at 63.
39. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-1, etseq. (1981).
40. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
41. Id. at 368.
42. 38 Ill. 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967).
43. Id at 539, 232 N.E.2d at 718.
44. Id at 541, 232 N.E.2d at 719. Indeed, the factual underpinnings of the two cases are
quite different. Gerald Gault, age fifteen, was charged with making lewd telephone calls, while
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held the statutory requirement of proof by a preponderance of the evi-
dence violated due process. The court stated:
Though the purpose of industrial training schools for boys, such as
that at St. Charles in Illinois, is to rehabilitate and train youths
whose misconduct has brought them to these institutions, the incar-
cerated juveniles' liberty of action is restrained just as effectively as
that of the adult inmates serving terms in State and Federal
prisons. 45
As in adult cases, a probation revocation need be proved only by a
preponderance of the evidence.46 Also, as in adult cases, voluntariness
of a confession may be considered at a probation revocation hearing. 47
The statute for transfer of a case from juvenile court to adult court
does not establish a specific burden of proof.48 Rather, section 702-7
sets forth criteria for the juvenile court to consider in determining
whether or not to transfer.49 The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that
the juvenile judge may use his discretion to determine whether transfer
is proper. The court found in People v. Taylor5° that the six criteria of
the statute are "specific enough to satisfy due process."' 51 The ultimate
test is whether there was an "abuse of discretion." 52 In Taylor, the at-
torney for the minor argued that evidence should be at least clear and
eleven year old Robert Urbasek was alleged to have murdered a playmate, also eleven. Id. at 537,
232 N.E.2d at 717. The Urbasek ruling voided the section of the then current Illinois Juvenile
Court Act (§ 701-4, § 704-6) which had incorporated a preponderance of the evidence standard.
Id at 542, 232 N.E.2d at 720.
45. Id at 541, 232 N.E.2d at 719.
46. In re Thompson, 79 Il1. 2d 262, 267, 402 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1980); In re Ephriam, 60 Ill.
App. 3d 848, 377 N.E.2d 49 (1st Dist. 1978).
47. In re McMillan, 74 Ill. 2d 478, 384 N.E.2d 348 (1978).
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7 (1981).
49. The criteria are stated as follows:
(a) In making its determination on a motion to permit prosecution under the crimi-
nal laws, the court shall consider among other matters: (1) whether there is sufficient
evidence upon which a grand jury may be expected to return an indictment; (2) whether
there is evidence that the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive and premedi-
tated manner; (3) the age of the minor; (4) the previous history of the minor; (5) whether
there are facilities particularly available to the Juvenile Court for the treatment and re-
habilitation of the minor; and (6) whether the best interest of the minor and the security
of the public may require that the minor continue in custody or under supervision for a
period extending beyond his minority. The rules of evidence shall be the same as under
Section 5-1 of this Act, 2 but no hearing on such motion may be commenced unless the
minor is represented in court by counsel. (b) If criminal proceedings are instituted, the
petition shall be dismissed insofar as the act or acts involved in the criminal proceedings
are concerned. Taking of evidence in an adjudicatory hearing in any such case is a bar
to criminal proceedings based upon the conduct alleged in the petition.
Id at § 702-7(3)(a). For a general discussion of provisions for transferring minors from juvenile
court to adult court, see Note, Relinquishment of Jurisdictionfor Purposes of Criminal Prosecution
of Juveniles, 8 No. Ky. L. REV. 377 (1981).
50. People v. Taylor, 76 111. 2d 289, 391 N.E.2d 366 (1979).
51. Id at 300, 391 N.E.2d at 371.
52. Id at 300-01, 391 N.E.2d at 371.
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convincing. The supreme court disagreed, stating, "The transfer hear-
ing not being adjudicatory, the procedural safeguards required at crim-
inal trials and adjudications of delinquency are not mandated by due
process."' 53 Section 702-7 has been upheld against constitutional attack
in two decisions by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 54
The Illinois Appellate Court stated in People v. Cater:55
The determinative standard to satisfy due process is fundamental
fairness. Fundamental fairness does not require the juvenile judge to
exercise his discretion with any degree of mathematical certainty.
Not all of the factors set forth in the transfer statute need be resolved
against the juvenile to satisfy a waiver of juvenile court
jurisdiction.56
Trial by Jury
In DeBacker v. Brainard,57 a 1969per curiam decision dismissing
the writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court declined to ad-
dress whether there was right to trial by jury in juvenile court. Justices
Black and Douglas dissented. Justice Douglas reasoned, "Given the
fundamental nature of the right to jury trial as expressed in Duncan
and Bloom, there is, as I see it, no constitutionally sufficient reason to
deprive the juvenile of this right."58
Two years after DeBacker, the Supreme Court speaking through
Justice Blackmun found in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania59 that a minor
tried in juvenile court has no constitutional right to trial by jury. The
majority opinion disagreed with Justice Douglas' dissent in DeBacker
that the right to trial by jury is "fundamental." The majority opinion
in McKeiver stated, "[O]ne cannot say that in our legal system the jury
is a necessary component of accurate factfinding. ' ' 60 The McKeiver
majority agreed with Justice Fortas in Gault and Justice Douglas in his
dissent in DeBacker that the stated goals of juvenile court fall short in
practice. The majority conceded, "Too often the juvenile court judge
falls far short of that stalwart, protective, and communicating figure the
system envisaged." 6'
53. Id at 303, 391 N.E.2d at 372.
54. United States v. Sielaff, 598 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1979); Bombacino v. Bensinger, 498 F.2d
875 (7th Cir. 1974).
55. 78 Il. App. 3d 983, 398 N.E.2d 28 (3d Dist. 1979), appeal dismissed, sub noma. Cater v.
Illinois, 449 U.S. 802 (1980).
56. ld at 987, 398 N.E.2d at 32.
57. 396 U.S. 28 (1969).
58. Id at 38.
59. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
60. Id at 543.
61. Id at 544.
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Though practical experience showed juvenile court falling short of
its goal, the McKeiver majority found that injecting jury trial into juve-
nile court would "remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary
process and [would] put an effective end to what has been the idealistic
prospect of an intimate, informal, protective proceeding. ' 62 The Court
in rejecting a juvenile's right to trial by jury also implicitly rejected his
having a sixth amendment right to public trial. The McKeiver Court
stated, "[lit would bring with it into that system the traditional delay,
the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system and, possibly, the
public trial."' 63 Four Justices dissented in McKeiver, including Justice
Brennan who pointed to "juveniles who fear that delinquency proceed-
ings will mask judicial oppression." 64
One year prior to the McKeiver decision, the Illinois Supreme
Court ruled in In re Fucini65 that the juvenile does not possess a consti-
tutional right to trial by jury. Using language strikingly similar to that
later to be used by the majority in McKeiver, the supreme court found
trial by jury "not crucial to a system of juvenile justice. '66
The Illinois Supreme Court had occasion to rule on the minor's
right to trial by jury on statutory grounds in a 1976 decision. The juve-
nile judge in People ex rel Carey v. White67 had granted the minor's
trial by jury on the basis of his interpretation of the Juvenile Court Act.
He stated, "The procedural rights assured to the minor shall be the
rights of adults unless specifically precluded by laws which enhance the
protection of such minors."68 Counsel for the minor argued that there
was no specific preclusion of trial by jury by the statute. The Illinois
Supreme Court ruled that since 1966 the legislature had specifically
eliminated a juvenile's right to trial by jury, which had existed in the
original 1899 Act and was in effect for sixty-seven years.69 The
supreme court granted the writ of mandamus against the juvenile court
judge and restated that there was no right to trial by jury, including an
advisory jury, under Illinois juvenile court law.70
It can be argued that under Illinois law the juvenile has not been
deprived of right to trial by jury at all. Under chapter 37, section 702-
62. Id at 545.
63. Id at 550.
64. Id at 555.
65. 44 Ill. 2d 305, 255 N.E.2d 380 (1970), appeal dismissed, 403 U.S. 925 (1971).
66. Id at 310, 255 N.E.2d at 382.
67. 65 I11. 2d 193, 357 N.E.2d 512 (1976).
68. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-2(3)(a) (1975).
69, 65 IU. 2d at 199, 357 N.E.2d at 514.
70. Id. at 202, 357 N.E.2d at 516.
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7(5), he has the absolute right upon filing a motion to have his case
transferred from juvenile to adult court.71 If he is the movant, he need
not show the criteria for transfer under section 702-7 that would be
required of the State. Upon having his case transferred to adult court,
he would have an absolute right to trial by jury. If the State, as mo-
vant, succeeds in obtaining transfer to adult court, the juvenile again
enjoys all rights of those in adult court, including the right to trial by
jury. If the State elects to proceed against a juvenile as an Habitual
Juvenile Offender, 72 and the juvenile elects not to request transfer to
the adult court, the statute provides for trial by jury for the minor in
juvenile court.73 This is the sole statutory exception providing trial by
jury for the minor in juvenile court.
Pleadings
The cornerstone of Gault is that the minor be given notice of
charges, an opportunity to be represented by counsel, and the right to
defend himself in a proceeding which is more than summary and arbi-
trary.74 The charges against the minor in juvenile court must be de-
scribed with certainty and particularity.75 In In re Carson,76 the
juvenile was charged with passing a "bad check." His conviction was
reversed on the basis that there was no certainty or particularity of
pleading that would give the juvenile adequate notice of charges
against him.77 But in In re D.LB. ,78 where no objection was made at
trial to what the court characterized as a "travesty of a charging instru-
ment," the objection was waived on appeal.79 The Illinois Appellate
Court held in In re Bryant:80
Due process of law requires that a juvenile, in the same manner as an
adult, be notified of the charges against him. The charges must "set
forth with particularity the misconduct upon which the delinquent
petition was based", so that the juvenile will be able to prepare a
proper defense and conduct "such investigation [of the charges] as
may be necessary." 81
71. People v. Jiles, 43 111. 2d 145, 251 N.E.2d 529 (1969); People v. Greve, 83 Ill. App. 3d 435,
403 N.E.2d 1230 (2d Dist. 1980).
72. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-12 (1981).
73. Id. at § 705-12-4.
74. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
75. In re Carson, 10 Ill. App. 3d 387, 294 N.E.2d 75 (3d Dist. 1973).
76. Id
77. Id. at 389, 294 N.E.2d at 77.
78. 102 Ill. App. 3d 75, 76, 429 N.E.2d 615, 616 (4th Dist. 1981).
79. Id at 77-78, 429 N.E.2d at 617.
80. 18 Il. App. 3d 887, 310 N.E.2d 713 (1st Dist. 1974).
81. Id at 892, 310 N.E.2d at 716.
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Exceptions to the particularity rule have appeared where the de-
fect in pleading is a "formal defect" only. In People v. Longley,8 2 fail-
ure of the State to allege that a weapon was concealed was found to be
a formal defect in connection with an unlawful use of weapon charge.
Though the petition must meet the requirements of an indictment, the
court stated: "We are of the opinion that the respondent was fully in-
formed of the charge and he has no solid ground upon which to
complain."8 3
In another case84 involving pleadings, the State failed to allege the
words "without authority" in a petition alleging burglary. After adju-
dicatory hearing, the minor's motion for dismissal was denied. The
juvenile court disposition was reversed because the pleading was "fa-
tally defective."85 The Illinois Appellate Court has also held that prov-
ing delivery of drugs to an individual other than the one named in the
petition was a non-fatal variance subject to amendment, as long as the
variance did not surprise defendant or prevent him from properly pre-
paring a defense.8 6
It would appear that fatal variances in pleadings requiring dismis-
sal are those going to the essence of the charge which prevent the juve-
nile from preparing a defense. Grammatical errors, misnomers, and
misstatement of the section number of the criminal statute may be non-
fatal variances or formal defects.
Confessions
In Fare v. Michael C. ,87 a sixteen and a half year old probationer
was arrested for murder. He was given his Miranda s8 rights and he
thereupon requested to see his probation officer. The police officer de-
nied his request and a confession followed. The United States
Supreme Court held that the request to speak to one's probation officer
is not a request for legal assistance requiring the cessation of question-
ing,89 and that such a request does not constitute a per se request to
remain silent.90 The Court held that the voluntariness of the waiver of
82. 16 Ill. App. 3d 405, 306 N.E.2d 527 (1st Dist. 1973).
83. Id. at 409, 306 N.E.2d at 530.
84. In re S.R.H., 106 Ill. App. 3d 276, 435 N.E.2d 883 (2d Dist. 1982).
85. Id at 278, 435 N.E.2d at 884.
86. In re McGovern, 62 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 1051, 379 N.E.2d 937, 939 (2d Dist. 1978).
87. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
88. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in which the Supreme Court outlined the
notice of fights required before conducting interrogation.
89. 442 U.S. at 722.
90. Id at 723.
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the juvenile's rights to remain silent and to consult with an attorney
would be decided by a totality-of-the-circumstances test.9' The major-
ity further found that the State, which carries the burden, in fact
showed voluntariness under the totality-of-the-circumstances. Justice
Marshall in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Ste-
vens, stated: "As this Court has consistently recognized, the coercive-
ness of the custodial setting is of heightened concern where, as here, a
juvenile is under investigation. '92
The majority, on the other hand, stated, "We discern no persua-
sive reasons why any other approach is required where the question is
whether a juvenile has waived his rights, as opposed to whether an
adult has done so.''93 Thus, the totality-of-the-circumstances approach
applies to juveniles as well as adults and "includes evaluation of the
juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence,
and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given
him, the nature of his fifth amendment rights, and the consequences of
waiving those rights."'94
Coming full circle from Gault, the majority argued in favor of ap-
plying the totality-of-the-circumstances test to minors as well as adults
on the basis that juvenile courts were particularly well situated to pro-
tect minors' rights:
There is no reason to assume that such courts--especially juvenile
courts with their special expertise in this area-will be unable to ap-
ply the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis so as to take into ac-
count those special concerns that are present when young persons
often with limited experience and education and with immature
judgment, are involved. Where the age and experience of a juvenile
indicate that his request for his probation officer or his parents is, in
fact, an invocation of his right to remain silent, the totality approach
will allow the court the necessary flexibility to take this into account
in making a waiver determination. At the same time, that approach
refrains from imposing rigid restraints on police and courts in deal-
ing with an experienced older juvenile with an extensive prior record
who knowingly and intelligently waives Fifth Amendment rights and
voluntarily consents to interrogation. 95
The foregoing statement indicates that a juvenile's request for his
parent does not necessarily require a cessation of questioning by the
police. Fare states that a totality-of-the-circumstances approach
91. Id at 725.
92. Id at 729 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall cited to the language of Haley v. Ohio, 332
U.S. 596 (1948); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962), and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
93. 442 U.S. at 725.
94. Id
95. Id at 725-26.
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would, depending on the facts, allow the court to find or not find that
the request to talk to a parent was a request to remain silent.
As pointed out in the dissent by Justice Powell,96 this approach
seems to be a departure from Gallegos v. Colorado97 and other cases,
which state that the greatest care must be taken to determine if a con-
fession of a juvenile is voluntary. In Gallegos, Justice Douglas, speak-
ing for the majority, reversed a conviction of a fourteen year old for
robbery and murder. Douglas pointed out that a confession was ob-
tained from the minor after his mother was denied the right to see him.
Justice Douglas described the circumstances as "secret inquisitorial
processes. ' '98 Justice Clark, in his dissent, argued there were no secret
inquisitorial processes in that the mother was told that the day she re-
quested to speak with her son was not a regular visiting day and that
she agreed to return on the next visiting day.99 Furthermore, Justice
Clark pointed out that the confession by the juvenile occurred shortly
after he was taken into custody and was not the result of wearing down
and intimidating the minor. 00 Though the majority opinion in Gal-
legos did not specifically state that refusing to allow a parent to see a
child under interrogation requires suppression of a confession, the ma-
jority decision categorized the procedures as "secret inquisitorial
processes." A fair inference is that granting the mother permission to
see her son would have removed the taint.
By striking dicta, the Fare majority stated that a minor's request to
see a parent does not necessarily require the absolute cessation of ques-
tioning,' 0 as would be the case with his request to talk to an attor-
ney.' 0 2 One result may well be giving constitutional protection only to
more sophisticated minors who are aware of their rights. These in-
clude, with inevitable exceptions, the well-educated middle and upper-
class children, the streetwise, and the experienced older juveniles who
have learned the system.
Although a request to speak to a parent apparently does not neces-
sarily negate the voluntariness of a confession, it is presently an open
96. Id at 732 (Powell, J., dissenting).
97. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
98. Id at 50.
99. Id at 61 (Clark, J., dissenting).
100. Id at 61-62.
101. 442 U.S. at 725. Although the Court was specifically focusing on a juvenile's request to
see his probation officer, and found such a request not to necessarily require cessation of question-
ing, the majority suggested, "[Ilf it were otherwise, a juvenile's request for almost anyone he con-
sidered trustworthy enough to give him reliable advice would trigger the rigid rule of Miranda."
Id. at 723.
102. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
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question whether the actions of the parent can waive constitutional
rights of a child. In David Lavelle W v. California,I3 certiorari was
denied in a per curiam decision. The minor was taken to the police
station for questioning apparently without probable cause and without
an arrest warrant. The minor was taken into custody on instruction
from his mother to the police. Justice Marshall dissented to the denial
of certiorari: "If petitioner had been five years older when the arrest
occurred, there would be no question that the judgment below must be
reversed." 104
Justice Marshall relied upon the landmark decisions of Dunaway v.
New York 105 and Wong Sun v. United States. 10 6 He pointed out that a
substantial issue was presented to the Court-whether a parent can
waive the child's constitutional rights. He stated:
Essential to this claim is the assumption that a parent's right to guide
her child's upbringing includes the authority to waive a constitu-
tional right that the child may have. I find this assumption extremely
disturbing for I see no way to cabin its implications. If a parent may,
without even consulting the child, waive his constitutional rights,
then the police may constitutionally coerce confessions from minors
so long as the officers have the parents' consent to their action. 0 7
Another case which similarly left a lingering question was Little v.
Arkansas, 08 where the majority denied certiorari. A minor was con-
victed of the murder of his father and sentenced to life imprisonment.
The mother was the initial suspect who, it developed, was lying next to
the father in bed during the crime. In a dissent to the denial of certio-
rari by Justice Marshall, it was argued that the Court should confront
the issue of whether before a minor can waive Miranda rights he is
entitled to competent advice from an adult possessing no significant
conflict of interest. 1 9 It appears that the Fare decision, decided a year
after the denial of certiorari in Little, implicitly answered Justice Mar-
shall's question in the negative.
The Fare Court focused on a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis
to decide whether the juvenile's "request for his probation officer or his
parents is, in fact, an invocation of his right to remain silent . . . 0
Under the Fare approach, there is no threshold inquiry into whether or
103. 449 U.S. 1043 (1980).
104. Id at 1045 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
106. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
107. 449 U.S. at 1048-49.
108. 435 U.S. 957 (1978).
109. Id
110. 442 U.S. at 725.
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not opportunity for consultation with an adult has been provided, as
was the emphasis in Gallegos. Rather, there is an after-the-fact deter-
mination of voluntariness based on totality-of-the-circumstances. It
appears then that there is no absolute requirement that the minor be
given opportunity to consult with an independent adult. As indicated
in Fare, the rights of the juvenile are the same as those of the adult.
The juvenile has the right to consult with counsel and to remain si-
lent.II The juvenile's request to talk to his probation officer, his par-
ents, or some other independent adult does not necessarily indicate,
according to Fare, his desire to remain silent or to speak with an attor-
ney. In this instance, placing the minor's rights at the level of an
adult's operates to diminish what were perceived to have been greater
juvenile rights.'1 12
The voluntariness of a juvenile's confession has been judged uni-
formly in Illinois by the standard of totality-of-the-circumstances. No
one factor creates an absolute requirement that a confession be found
involuntary. None of the following by itself requires a finding of invol-
untariness: police abuse, absence of a parent at interrogation, failure to
notify parents that the minor is in custody, minor's drug usage before
interrogation, failure to notify minor his case can be transferred to
adult court, youth of the minor, or the minor's low I.Q.
The leading case in Illinois is In re Lamb," 3 a 4-3 decision of the
Illinois Supreme Court where the minor was hung up in a cell by hand-
cuffs and allegedly struck by a police officer. The court's finding brings
into play not only the rule of totality-of-the-circumstances, but mani-
fest weight of the evidence as the standard of review: "After a full
consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding respon-
dent's confession, we believe the trial court's finding that it was volun-
tarily given is clearly not contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence." 14
In another case, a minor admitted a rape when answering his fa-
ther at a police station interrogation. 1 5 The trial court's holding that
the confession was voluntary was affirmed. The supreme court found
111. Id
112. The mere giving of Miranda warnings does not necessarily foreclose the question of vol-
untariness of a subsequent confession. In the various cases discussed in this section, Miranda
rights were given. See, e.g., David Lavelle W. v. California, 449 U.S. 1043 (1980); Fare v. Michael
C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979); Little v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 957 (1978); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49
(1962).
113. 61 111. 2d 383, 336 N.E.2d 753 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 938 (1976).
114. Id. at 389, 336 N.E.2d at 756.
115. People v. Hawkins, 53 Ill. 2d 181, 290 N.E.2d 231 (1972).
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that "[tihe father's testimony [did] not reveal his being used as a police
instrumentality."' 16
Where a minor smoked marijuana in the afternoon and evening
immediately before interrogation, appeared drugged to one police of-
ficer, was mouthy and swore a great deal, but walked properly, the to-
tality-of-the-circumstances test in In re Shutters 1 7 resulted in
upholding the confession. The drugged condition was considered
"merely one of the factors." '" 8 The determination of voluntariness was
found not against the manifest weight of the evidence that the defend-
ant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent." 9
In People v. Prude, 120 a murder case transferred to adult court, the
minor claimed the police's failure to tell him of the possibility of trans-
fer to adult court made his confession involuntary. 121 An additional
argument was that though the juvenile knew the victim was shot three
times, he did not know the victim had died. 122 Citing Lamb and the
totality test, the Illinois Supreme Court in Prude reversed the trial
court's suppression of the confession: "We consider, however, that the
circumstance that an accused is a juvenile does not of itself require that
he be advised he may be prosecuted as if he were an adult before he
may knowingly waive his right to remain silent."' 123
Notification and Presence of Parents
Section 703-2 of the Juvenile Court Act requires that the arresting
officer "shall immediately make a reasonable attempt to notify the par-
ent or other person legally responsible" that the minor is in custody
and where he is being held.' 24 The statute contains no sanction for
noncompliance.
The Illinois Supreme Court held in People v. Steptore 25 that unex-
plained failure to comply with section 703-2 requirements did not com-
pel suppressing the minor's confession.
The People admit that the officers who arrested and questioned de-
fendant did not comply with section 3-2. The record shows beyond
question that defendant, prior to making the statement, was admon-
116. Id at 185, 290 N.E.2d at 233.
117. 56 Ill. App. 3d 184, 370 N.E.2d 1225 (2d Dist. 1977).
118. Id at 188, 370 N.E.2d at 1228.
119. Id at 190, 370 N.E.2d at 1227.
120. 66 Ill. 2d 470, 363 N.E.2d 371, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977).
121. Id at 475, 363 N.E.2d at 373.
122. Id at 477, 363 N.E.2d at 374.
123. Id at 476, 363 N.E.2d at 373.
124. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 703-2(1) (1981).
125. 51 111. 2d 208, 281 N.E.2d 642 (1972).
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ished in detail with respect to his right to remain silent and to have
counsel immediately available, and that defendant understood the
admonition. Under the circumstances, failure to comply with section
3-2 did not render the statement inadmissible.1 26
In another decision, People v. Baxtrom,127 the sister of the minor
was told by the arresting officer her brother was being taken into cus-
tody and where he would be. The officer inquired whether the father
was at home and was told he was not. No inquiry was made regarding
the mother. The appellate court stated the police have no "affirmative
duty to scour the city" and need make only a "reasonable attempt to
notify the parents."'' 28 The police's efforts to contact the parents are
only one factor in judging the totality-of-the-circumstances determin-
ing the voluntariness of the minor's confession. 29
In the case of a sixteen year old orphan charged with murder, 30
no attempt was made to notify a responsible adult. It was argued that a
juvenile could not waive rights without counsel of an adult. Employing
a totality-of-the-circumstances test, the First District Appellate Court
stated: "It is clear that juveniles are not free from police investigation
and the failure to have a parent or guardian present during questioning
of a juvenile does not necessarily render statements made at that time
inadmissible." 131
In In re D. WS. ,132 the appellate court noted "the preferability of
having the parents or other responsible adults present during question-
ing,"133 but found unsuccessful efforts to locate the parents to be suffi-
cient. The minor denied involvement and stated he wished not to
speak with the police officer. Two or two and one half hours later, the
same officer repeated Miranda warnings and resumed interrogation at
a new location.134 Citing Michigan v. Mosley, 35 a divided appellate
court ruled that the resumption did not violate the minor's fifth amend-
126. Id at 214-15, 281 N.E.2d at 645.
127. 81 111. App. 3d 653, 402 N.E.2d 327 (5th Dist. 1980).
128. Id at 660, 402 N.E.2d at 332 (emphasis in original).
129. Id The Baxtrom court considered such factors as the officers' attempt to locate a juvenile
officer, the officers' duty to investigate crimes, the communication of Miranda warnings, the ability
of the juvenile to understand his rights, the opportunity of the juvenile to contact his parents or
counsel, and the lack of request from the juvenile to have either his parents or attorney present
during questioning. The court concluded that "[t]he question to be resolved is whether the state-
ment was made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement, of any sort or whether
the appellant's will was overborne at the time he confessed." Id at 661.
130. In re Bizzle, 36 Ill. App. 3d 321, 343 N.E.2d 633 (1st Dist. 1976).
131. Id at 326, 343 N.E.2d at 638.
132. 99 Ill. App. 3d 1035, 426 N.E.2d 284 (3d Dist. 1981).
133. Id at 1039, 426 N.E.2d at 287.
134. Id at 1036-37, 426 N.E.2d at 285-86.
135. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
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ment rights. 136
In In re Bertrand,37 the appellate court found that the police did
not mislead the minor's father into not coming into the police station
and telling the police to proceed with questioning. Nevertheless, the
court stated in dictum, "Assuming, arguendo, that police did mislead
the father, this cause is not so close as to allow this to be a significant
factor in determining the voluntariness of the confession."'' 38 Having
the parent present was termed "good practice."' 39 However, the court
concluded, "[A] juvenile's waiver of rights is not rendered ineffective
by failure of his parents to be present."' 140
Age and Mental Disabilities
The fact of minority does not give the minor immunity from inter-
rogation. The appellate court has held, "[T]he age of the defendant
does not ipso facto make a statement inadmissible if it is voluntary." ' 4'
In People v. Simmons,142 the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned in a
5-2 decision that a juvenile judge should take "special care in scrutiniz-
ing the record"' 143 in determining whether the statement of a "border-
line-mentally-retarded boy'4 was voluntary. Employing the totality-
of-the-circumstances test, the court stated that mental deficiency is a
factor in determining voluntariness. Citing Haley v. Ohio, 145 a decision
later invoked by Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in the 1980 Fare
v. Michael C 146 opinion, the Simmons court found the juvenile court
did not use "special care in scrutinizing the record" and remanded the
case for rehearing on the motion to suppress. 47
Two years after Simmons, the appellate court affirmed the juvenile
136. 99 I11. App. 3d at 1038-39, 426 N.E.2d at 287-88.
137. 65 I11. App. 3d 703, 382 N.E.2d 660 (2d Dist. 1978).
138. Id at 705, 382 N.E.2d at 662.
139. Id.
140. Id
141. In re Morgan, 35 Ill. App. 3d 10, 14, 341 N.E.2d 19, 22 (1st Dist. 1975).
142. 60 Ill. 2d 173, 326 N.E.2d 383 (1975).
143. Id. at 181, 326 N.E.2d at 387.
144. Id at 181, 326 N.E.2d at 384. A psychiatrist testified at trial that Simmons' I.Q. was 80, a
score which placed him in the lowest 20 percentile of the population. Tests also showed Simmons
to be quite low in comprehension of social situations, ability to think abstractly and general
information.
145. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
146. 442 U.S. 707 (1979). See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
147. 60 111. 2d at 181, 326 N.E.2d at 384. Defense counsel had made a motion to suppress an
oral statement made by Simmons to a polygraph examiner. The statement was the only testimony
offered at trial that defendant had intended to kill rather than frighten the two youths he was
charged with murdering. At trial, Simmons had been found guilty by a jury of both murder
charges. Id at 175, 326 N.E.2d at 383-84.
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court's finding of voluntariness where one expert testified the minor
was functionally illiterate and possessed an I.Q. of 52. 148 Once again,
the test was totality-of-the-circumstances, though the court cited lan-
guage from Simmons. 149 The juvenile court's determination, the appel-
late court stated, would not be reversed unless it was against the
manifest weight of the evidence.150
Admissions
The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled in In re Beasley' 5' that due
process does not require strict adherence by the juvenile court to the
requirements for taking a plea under Supreme Court Rule 402.152 The
court considered chapter 37, section 701-2(3)1 53 which requires that the
minor have the same procedural rights as an adult unless specifically
excluded. The court held that the admission must be made "intelli-
gently and voluntarily, though not necessarily in accordance with Rule
402."'154 The Beasley holding was:
[I]t was not necessary that the three minors involved in the present
148. In re Morris, 49 111. App. 3d 284, 364 N.E.2d 958 (lst Dist. 1977).
149. Id at 290, 364 N.E.2d at 962.
150. Id at 291, 364 N.E.2d at 962.
151. 66 Ill. 2d 385, 362 N.E.2d 1024 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1016 (1978).
152. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I IOA, § 402 (1981). The rule, in pertinent part, requires the judge in
adult court to give the following admonitions and make the following determinations:
(a) Admonitions to Defendant. The court shall not accept a plea of guilty without
first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing him of and deter-
mining that he understands the following:
(1) the nature of the charge;
(2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including, when appli-
cable, the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected because of prior convictions
or consecutive sentences;
(3) that the defendant has the right to plead not guilty, or to persist in that plea if it
has already been made, or to plead guilty; and
(4) that if he pleads guilty there will not be a trial of any kind, so that by pleading
guilty he waives the right to a trial by jury and the right to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.
(b) Determining Whether the Plea is Voluntary. The court shall not accept a plea of
guilty without first determining that the plea is voluntary. If the tendered plea is the
result of a plea agreement, the agreement shall be stated in open court. The court, by
questioning the defendant personally in open court, shall confirm the terms of the plea
agreement, or that there is no agreement, and shall determine whether any force or
threats or any promises, apart from a plea agreement, were used to obtain the plea.
(c) Determining Factual Basis for Plea. The court shall not enter final judgment on
a plea of guilty without first determining that there is a factual basis for the plea.
Id. at § 402(a)-(c).
153. The pertinent text of § 701-2(3) is:
(3) In all procedures under this Act, the following shall apply:
a) The procedural rights assured to the minor shall be the rights of adults unless
specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protection of such minors.
ILL REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-2(3)(a) (1981).
154. 66 11. 2d at 391, 362 N.E.2d at 1027.
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appeal be told by the trial judges that their admissions waived their
rights against self-incrimination and their rights to confront their ac-
cusers, the two Boykin rights that are applicable to juvenile proceed-
ings. It is sufficient to satisfy due process requirements that it be
apparent from the record that the minors were aware of the conse-
quences of their admissions; that is, that they understood their rights
against self-incrimination, their rights to confront their accusers and
their rights to a trial. 155
The factual basis of the taking of a plea was the point of contro-
versy in In re Haggins,156 decided by the Illinois Supreme Court.
There was no inquiry by the juvenile judge concerning the element of
battery regarding "without legal justification." Such a discrepancy in
factual basis was found to be "no violation of due process."' 157
Citing Beasley, an Illinois appellate court has held that it is not a
violation of due process to fail to notify a juvenile that the duration of
commitment to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, may
last until age twenty-one. 158 Again, it was held that an admission in
juvenile court need not adhere to the strict requirements under
Supreme Court Rule 402.159
In In re Claudio, 60 a decision raising voluntariness of the admis-
sion, the juvenile's attorney admitted the probation violation on behalf
of the juvenile and recited the various rights he had explained to the
juvenile. The minor remained silent. The failure of the court to in-
quire into the minor's waiver of rights was found not to be a violation
of due process. The appellate court stated, however, "[I]t may have
been preferable for the trial court to have questioned the minor to es-
tablish the knowing and voluntary waiver of rights and to disclose the
factual basis."' 6 1 In a different case, where the admission to a violation
of probation was induced by the judge's statement that the disposition
would not be to the Department of Corrections, a subsequent disposi-
tion to the Department of Corrections violated due process. 62
Although the decisions permit relative informality in the taking of
admissions, the better practice is for the judge to discuss at length with
155. Id at 392, 362 N.E.2d at 1027.
156. 67 IlL. 2d 102, 364 N.E.2d 54 (1977).
157. Id at 107, 364 N.E.2d at 56.
158. In re Morris, 49 Ill. App. 3d 284, 288-89, 364 N.E.2d 958, 961 (lst Dist. 1977).
159. Id
160. 39 Ill. App. 3d 107, 350 N.E.2d 177 (1st Dist. 1976).
161. Id at 109, 350 N.E.2d at 178.
162. In re Sturdivant, 44 111. App. 3d 410, 358 N.E.2d 80 (Ist Dist. 1976). The court found that
due process required either that the judge's promise to place Sturdivant in a facility other than the
Department of Corrections be fulfilled or that the minor be allowed to withdraw his admission.
Id at 412, 358 N.E.2d at 81.
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the minor his rights, and the possible consequences of waiving his
rights within the format of Rule 402.
Dispositions-Sentences
Under Illinois law, the juvenile court has jurisdiction over any per-
son under seventeen years of age at the time of the offense 163 and delin-
quent wardship may remain open until age twenty-one. 64 Juvenile
court may entertain a petition for revocation of probation after the mi-
nor reaches age seventeen if filed within the probationary period. If
filed within the probationary period, the hearing and finding of viola-
tion may occur after the period of probation expired.' 65 A juvenile
under the age of thirteen may not be committed to the Department of
Corrections, Juvenile Division.' 66 Consequently, one sent to the De-
partment of Corrections just after his thirteenth birthday could theoret-
ically remain there until his twenty-first birthday, or almost eight years
later.
Under section 702-2, a delinquent minor is one who violates any
federal or state law or municipal ordinance. 167 Consequently, commis-
sion of a Class C misdemeanor, punishable in adult court by no more
than thirty days, or an ordinance violation carrying no jail sentence,
can be the basis of delinquent wardship. As such, it can result in com-
mitment to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division. As a
practical matter, a minor stands little chance of being committed to the
Department of Corrections for a first time disorderly conduct offense.
This is especially true in light of the standards for commitment found
in section 705-10.68 Yet, if a minor had an extensive delinquent back-
ground, commission of a Class C misdemeanor or an ordinance viola-
163. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-2 (1981).
164. Id. at §705-11.
165. In re Thompson, 79 111. 2d 262, 402 N.E.2d 609 (1980).
166. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-2(l)(a)(5) (1981).
167. The section states, in pertinent part:
2-2. Delinquent Minor. Those who are delinquent include any minor who prior to his
17th birthday has violated or attempted to violate, regardless of where the act occurred,
any federal or state law or municipal ordinance.
Id. at § 702-2.
168. The standards are set out in § 705-10(t):
(1) When any delinquent has been adjudged a ward of the court under this Act, the court
may commit him to the Department of Corrections if it finds that (a) his parents, guard-
ian or legal custodian are unfit or unable, for some other reason than financial circum-
stances alone, to care for, protect, train or discipline the minor, or are unwilling to do so,
and (b) the best interests of the minor and the public will not be served by placement
under Section 5-7 [§ 705-7, concerning placement other than with the Department of
Corrections].
1d. at § 705-10(I).
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tion might culminate in commitment to the Department of Corrections.
The question then arises whether sentencing a youth for confinement
possibly to the age of twenty-one violates due process or equal protec-
tion when commission of the same offense by an adult would result in
no more than thirty days in the county jail or a fine.
The question was answered by Justice Stevens in United States ex
rel. Wilson v. Coughlin,'169 a 1973 Seventh Circuit decision. Four
juveniles filed petitions for habeas corpus on the basis that they had
served more time in the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division,
than authorized by law for adult offenders for comparable offenses.
The court stated:
A juvenile delinquent may be incarcerated until his twenty-first
birthday, no matter how insignificant the misconduct that resulted in
the jurisdictional finding of delinquency, provided that the requisite
findings are made at his dispositional hearing, and provided further
that he does not demonstrate that his best interests would be served
by an earlier release. Thus, a juvenile's indeterminate sentence may
be longer than the maximum period of imprisonment for an adult
guilty of a like offense. This potential difference in treatment does
not invalidate the statutory distinction between adults and juveniles
because off-setting benefits generally result in favored treatment for
the youthful offender.' 70
Justice Stevens' observation is well founded. Under juvenile prac-
tice, a minor charged in a juvenile court petition with an offense carry-
ing a mandatory sentence in adult court need not receive a mandatory
sentence and is eligible for court supervision or probation. If commit-
ted to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, such a juve-
nile would serve no more than that time between his present age and
age twenty-one. An exception, of course, arises upon transfer to adult
court under section 702-7. Conviction there gives rise to the various
sentencing alternatives and determinate sentences of chapter 38.
An exception to the availability of probation or supervision in ju-
venile court is a disposition under the Habitual Juvenile Offender Act
under section 705-12. Though the prosecution under the Act is in juve-
nile court, the minor is entitled to trial by jury.171 If the State proves its
case beyond a reasonable doubt and a third adjudication of delinquent
wardship results, the minor must be committed to the Department of
Corrections without the possibility of parole, probation or supervi-
169. 472 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1973).
170. Id at 102-03.
171. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-12(a), (b) (1981).
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Sion.17 2 The statute provides a determinate sentence of confinement to
the age of twenty-one along with one day good time for every day
served. The supreme court has found the procedure not to violate due
process and has granted mandamus against trial courts which found it
unconstitutional. 173
There has been some movement toward particularity and limita-
tion in the area of juvenile sentencing. For example, Illinois juvenile
courts at one time typically placed a minor on juvenile court probation
without a specific termination date. Such a practice has been declared
void by the Illinois Supreme Court. In In re Sneed,1 74 the court
pointed to section 705-3(1) which states, "Theperiod of probation...
shall not exceed 5 years or until the minor has attained the age of 21
years, whichever is less." 7 -
The Sneed court also stated the following requirements for revoca-
tion or extension of probation: "Insofar as we believe sec. 5-3(6) was
designed to protect against the loss of liberty without due process, we
hold that probation may not be extended or revoked without notice
and hearing and a finding that the minor has violated a condition of
probation." 176
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In Eddings v. Oklahoma,177 a 5-4 decision in 1982, the United
States Supreme Court reversed a death sentence for a sixteen year old
convicted of murder. The majority did not ground its decision on a
specific eighth amendment basis. The Court stated: "We are con-
cerned here only with the manner of the imposition of the ultimate
penalty: the death sentence imposed for the crime of murder upon an
emotionally disturbed youth with a disturbed child's immaturity."'
' 78
Chief Justice Burger objected because the Court had taken for re-
view the narrow question whether the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments prohibit a sentence of death on a defendant who was sixteen at
the time of the offense. 179 That question remains unanswered.
172. Id at 705-12(c).
173. People ex rel. Carey v. Chrastka, 83 I11. 2d 67, 413 N.E.2d 1269 (1980).
174. 72 Ill. 2d 326, 381 N.E.2d 272 (1978).
175. Id. at 334, 381 N.E.2d at 275 (emphasis in original).
176. Id 381 N.E.2d at 275.
177. - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982).
178. - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. at 877.
179. - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. at 879 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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Double Jeopardy
In Breed v. Jones,80 decided in 1975, the United States Supreme
Court found that trying a juvenile as an adult after adjudicating him a
delinquent in juvenile court for the same offense constituted double
jeopardy. The Court found that the adjudicatory hearing presented lit-
tle to distinguish it from "a traditional criminal prosecution."' 8' The
Court stated:
We do not agree with petitioner that giving respondent the constitu-
tional protection against multiple trials in this context will diminish
flexibility and informality to the extent that those qualities relate
uniquely to the goals of the juvenile-court system. We agree that
such a holding will require, in most cases, that the transfer decision
be made prior to an adjudicatory hearing. 182
The Court observed that were its decision otherwise, the minor would
be confronted with the unfortunate choice of cooperating with the juve-
nile probation officer and thus prejudicing a possible adult prosecution
or being uncooperative with the juvenile probation officer and preju-
dicing a juvenile court disposition. 8 3
In Swisher v. Brady,8 4 a decision by the United States Supreme
Court in 1978, a statutorily created master heard a juvenile case and
found the juvenile not responsible. The statute provided that if no ex-
ceptions were filed by the State or the juvenile, the master's decision
was to be confirmed, modified or remanded by the juvenile judge. The
State filed exceptions. Without hearing additional proof, the juvenile
court found the juvenile to be responsible, rejecting the findings and
recommendations of the master. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the
majority, found that the procedure was not a violation of double jeop-
ardy. The Court reasoned that there was no final decision until the
juvenile court judge ruled. '8 5 In a vigorous dissent by Justice Marshall,
joined by Justices Brennan and Powell, the procedure was categorized
as double jeopardy or unacceptable continuing jeopardy. Justice Mar-
shall stated that the procedure was akin to a review of a trial court's
decision by a reviewing court.18 6
180. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
181. Id at 530.
182. Id at 535-36.
183. Id at 540. Relying on Gault, In re Winship and McKeiver, the Court regarded this di-
lemma as being at odds with the goal that adjudicatory hearings in juvenile court be informal and
nonadversarial. Id.
184. 438 U.S. 204 (1978).
185. Id at 215.
186. Id at 222 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The leading double jeopardy case in Illinois is In re Vitale. 187 In
Vitale, the juvenile pleaded guilty to traffic charges of failing to reduce
speed and was fined. On the following day, the States Attorney filed a
petition for adjudication of delinquency based upon a charge of invol-
untary manslaughter. The latter arose out of the same occurrence for
which the minor was fined in traffic court. The minor brought a mo-
tion to dismiss the juvenile proceedings on the basis of double jeop-
ardy. The motion was granted and the State appealed. The Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, stating: "So here the two sepa-
rate statutory offenses of failing to reduce speed and involuntary man-
slaughter need not be identical, either in their basic ingredients or in
their proof to be the 'same' within the double jeopardy clause."'' 88
But in another case, where the juvenile court previously made a
disposition of a probation violation and subsequently employed the
same violation as a basis of commitment to the Department of Correc-
tions, the commitment was reversed on due process grounds. 8 9
In a case where the juvenile judge erroneously dismissed the peti-
tion for what was a non-fatal variance in pleading, the Second District
of the Illinois Appellate Court stated that the judge was in error, but
that the error could not be corrected as double jeopardy attached. 90
The court stated, "The doctrine of double jeopardy applies to delin-
quency proceedings as it does to criminal proceedings."' 9'
Proceeding against a minor on a Minor Otherwise in Need of Su-
pervision [MINS]1 92 petition has been held to bar the state on double
187. 71111. 2d 229, 375 N.E.2d 87 (1978), cert. granted, vacated and remanded mem., 439 U.S.
974 (1978), cert. granted, 444 U.S. 823 (1979), vacated and remanded, 447 U.S. 974 (1980).
188. Id at 237, 375 N.E.2d at 90. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1978
to vacate the judgment and remand the case to the Illinois Supreme Court for a determination by
the state court whether its judgment was based on federal constitutional law or state constitutional
law. 439 U.S. 974 (1978). After the Illinois court certified its decision was based on federal consti-
tutional law, the Supreme Court once again granted certiorari. 444 U.S. 823 (1979). In a five-four
decision, the Court once again remanded the case to the Illinois Supreme Court to determine the
relationship, under Illinois law, of the crimes of manslaughter and failure to reduce speed to avoid
an accident. 447 U.S. 410 (1980). The majority held that if failure to reduce speed to avoid an
accident was an element required to be proved under Illinois law in order to find a person guilty
of manslaughter with an automobile, then Vitale could not be subjected to another adjudication
because his conviction of the lesser included offense bars his subsequent trial on the greater of-
fense. Id at 421.
189. In re R.R., 64 Ill. App. 3d 818, 381 N.E.2d 1187 (2d Dist. 1978).
190. In re McGovern, 62 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 379 N.E.2d 937 (2d Dist. 1978).
191. Id at 1052, 379 N.E.2d at 940.
192. Minor Otherwise in Need of Supervision, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-3 (1981). The
language of § 702-3 read as follows prior to January 1, 1983:
§ 2-3. Minor Otherwise in Need of Supervision. Those otherwise in need of supervision
include (a) any minor under 18 years of age who is beyond the control of his
parents, guardian or other custodian; (b) any minor subject to compulsory school
attendance who is habitually truant from school; and (c) any minor who is an
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jeopardy grounds from proceeding on the same facts against the minor
on a delinquency petition.' 93 This is an especially significant result, as
MINS cases have been uniformly treated as non-criminal in nature.
An Illinois appellate court ruled in People v. Ray 194 that a six
month continuance in juvenile court did not preclude the State from
petitioning to transfer the case to adult court and prosecuting the minor
there. The decision pointed out that the juvenile court "never made a
finding of fact as to the allegations in the petition."' 195 The opinion
does not mention whether the lengthy continuance was a disposition of
court supervision under section 704-7. Clearly, if the juvenile judge
hears evidence and finds the minor responsible, a subsequent placing of
the minor on section 704-7 supervision is a disposition and double
jeopardy attaches. Under Breed v. Jones,196 hearing of any evidence at
the adjudicatory hearing, or taking of an admission, with nothing more,
creates jeopardy. 197 Section 702-7(3) reflects the judicial rule: "Taking
of evidence in an adjudicatory hearing in any such case is a bar to
criminal proceedings based upon the conduct alleged in the peti-
tion."' 198 Where no evidence is taken at an adjudicatory hearing and no
admission is taken, the granting of section 704-7 supervision may not
create jeopardy. This clearly would be the result under Ray. However,
the Illinois Supreme Court held in 1982199 that placing a juvenile on
section 704-7 supervision can be a disposition if the substantial result is
to place the minor on "conditional discharge. ' ' 200 That rationale might
well create jeopardy and render Ray anachronistic.
People v. Smith 20 ' presents an interesting factual situation. Smith
was charged in adult court with armed robbery but was convicted of
misdemeanor theft and other misdemeanor charges. It developed that
the defendant was a minor and had lied about his age. The conviction
was vacated and the case sent to juvenile court. In turn, the juvenile
court transferred the case to adult court under section 702-7. The mi-
nor was convicted of armed robbery in adult court. The Illinois
addict, as defined in the "Drug Addiction Act"; and (d) on or after January 1,
1974, any minor who violates a lawful court order made under this Act. MINS
jurisdiction is repealed as of January 1, 1983, and is replaced by Minor Requiring
Authoritative Intervention jurisdiction. S.B. 623, § 2-3, 82d Gen. Ass. (1982).
193. In re R.L.K., 67 111. App. 3d 451, 456, 384 N.E.2d 531, 535 (4th Dist. 1978).
194. 51 111. App. 3d 748, 366 N.E.2d 960 (5th Dist. 1977).
195. Id. at 749, 366 N.E.2d at 961.
196. 421 U.S. 519 (1975). See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
197. Sims v. Engle, 619 F.2d 598 (6th Cir. 1980).
198. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(3)(a) (1981).
199. In re J.N., 91 Ill. 2d 122, 435 N.E.2d 473 (1982).
200. Id at 128, 435 N.E.2d at 476.
201. 59 Ill. 2d 236, 319 N.E.2d 760 (1974).
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Supreme Court held, "Under these circumstances defendant cannot
complain that he has been subjected to double jeopardy. ' 20 2 However,
the conviction for armed robbery was reversed on the basis that the
charge was nolle prosequied in the first adult court proceeding. 20 3 It
appears that the first adult proceeding, procured as it was by the mi-
nor's concealing his age, did not bar a new trial but did limit the range
of offenses for which the minor could be convicted.
In a hearing on a motion to transfer a juvenile to adult court, the
juvenile court's denial of that motion may set the stage for double jeop-
ardy. A subsequent adjudicatory hearing in juvenile court creates jeop-
ardy under Breed v. Jones. Thus, the State's going forward at the
adjudicatory hearing bars the juvenile's prosecution in criminal court,
which the State preferred, and makes mandatory determinate sentences
and other consequences of adult court unavailable. It is at this point
that the State must consider an interlocutory appeal.
The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that the interlocutory deci-
sion not to transfer to adult court is appealable and that juvenile court
proceedings may be stayed in the interim. 2°4 The court's recent rulings
to this effect place such a case in undetermined status during the pen-
dency of appeal. If proceedings are stayed, the case may not proceed in
juvenile court and it may not proceed in adult court because of the
juvenile court's refusal to transfer.
The prosecution argued unsuccessfully in People v. Boclaire20 5 that
section 702-7 violates the separation of powers doctrine because the
court's decision determined in which court the States Attorney could
prosecute. Also analogous is People v. Woodward,2°6 in which the ap-
pellate court found that there was no constitutional right of the minor
to prosecution in juvenile court, but "where a minor is so prosecuted he
is entitled to the fundamental requirements of due process. ' 20 7
Denial of a motion to transfer was held not an abuse of discretion
where the minor was charged with murder and was in need of long
202. Id at 241, 319 N.E.2d at 763.
203. Id at 241-42, 319 N.E.2d at 763-64.
204. People ex rel. Davis v. Vasquez, 92 Ill. 2d 132, 441 N.E.2d 54 (1982); People v. Martin, 67
I11. 2d 462, 367 N.E.2d 1329 (1977). However, the juvenile court's interlocutory decision permit-
ting transfer to adult court remains unappealable. People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289, 391 N.E.2d 366
(1979); People v. Jiles, 43 I11. 2d 145, 251 N.E.2d 529 (1969). In People ex rel. Davis v. Vasquez,
the court stated, "In People v. Taylor, (1979), 76 I1I. 2d 289, this court reaffirmed the holding in
Jiles that the minor has no right to an immediate appeal of an order permitting transfer to adult
court." 92 Ill. 2d at 141, 441 N.E.2d at 57.
205. 33 IU. App. 3d 534, 337 N.E.2d 728 (1st Dist. 1975).
206. 77 IU. App. 3d 352, 395 N.E.2d 1203 (2d Dist. 1979).
207. Id at 354, 395 N.E.2d at 1205.
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term psychiatric treatment.20 8 The juvenile court judge stated that the
purpose of the adult Department of Corrections was to punish and not
rehabilitate. The State unsuccessfully argued that the statement vio-
lated the separation of powers doctrine by being an unconstitutional
exercise of legislative authority by a judge.209
Recent Legislation
Much of the foregoing discussion is greatly affected by recent leg-
islation removing certain offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction. Sec-
tion 702-7 was amended in the summer of 1982 to read under
subsection (6)(a), "The definition of delinquent minor under section 2-
2 of this Act shall not apply to any minor who at the time of an offense
was at least 15 years of age and who is charged with murder, rape,
deviate sexual assault or armed robbery when the armed robbery was
committed with a firearm. '' 210 Thus, the States Attorney can select ju-
venile court or adult court by virtue of which charges he prefers. Initi-
ating the prosecution in adult court eliminates both the need to seek
transfer from juvenile court and, in the event of denial of the transfer
request, the subsequent attachment of jeopardy in an undesired forum.
Offenses not specifically excluded remain in juvenile court. It
would appear, for example, that charging only robbery, rather than
armed robbery with a firearm, leaves the case in juvenile court and
requires the state to petition for transfer under section 702-7. It should
also be noted that certain mandatory sentence offenses have not been
excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction. These include aggravated
kidnapping, heinous battery, aggravated arson, home invasion, treason,
armed violence with a firearm, and residential burglary. These remain
in juvenile court and can be transferred only in accordance with section
702-7.
Confidentiality of Juvenile Proceedings
As mentioned in the McKeiver decision, were the minor to have a
trial by jury, such a right could lead to a public hearing which would
defeat the confidentiality intended by the juvenile court proceedings. 21l
In Illinois, the court records of the minor must be kept confidential and
not divulged even to victims except where the minor has been adjudi-
208. In re R.L.L., 106 Ill. App. 3d 209, 435 N.E.2d 904 (4th Dist. 1982).
209. Id at 212, 435 N.E.2d at 907.
210. P.A. 82-0973 (1982), amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-2.
211. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). See supra notes 53-58 and accompany-
ing text.
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cated a delinquent and where "specific court approval" is given.21 2
Records of law enforcement officers may not be opened for public in-
spection except as provided in several exceptions set forth in section
702-8.213
A juvenile court may order photographs, fingerprints and other
law enforcement records expunged. Initially, this was accomplished
through "inherent equitable authority" 214 and is now accomplished by
statutory authorization under section 702-10.
The confidentiality of juvenile information does not prohibit im-
peachment of a witness who has been adjudicated a delinquent ward.
In People v. Norwood,2 15 the Illinois Supreme Court stated: "In our
opinion this statute is not to be construed as prohibiting access to the
records of juvenile delinquents when those records are sought in order
to impeach the credibility of the juvenile as a witness by showing a
possible motive for testifying falsely."'216 A 1982 revision to section
702-10 similarly permits such impeachment. "Evidence and adjudica-
tions" in delinquency cases are also admissible in criminal bail or
fitness matters and civil proceedings arising out of the incident giving
rise to the juvenile proceedings. 217
First amendment rights of the media have come into play in a con-
flicting role with the juvenile's right of anonymity. Two decisions of
the United States Supreme Court have ruled in favor of the media's
first amendment positions. In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Com-
pany,21 8 a newspaper published the name of a juvenile charged with
murder in a juvenile court proceeding. A statute made publishing of
the name of a juvenile offender a misdemeanor. The statute was found
unconstitutional because the State's interest in protecting the minor's
anonymity was outbalanced by the media's first amendment rights.
2 19
In Oklahoma Publishing Company v. District Court,220 the press
was present at a minor's hearing and published his name. As he left
the court building, his picture was taken. Thereafter, the juvenile court
enjoined the media from publishing or broadcasting the name or pic-
212. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-10.1 (1981).
213. These exceptions would include court order, after institution of criminal proceedings
under section 702-7, for a pre-sentence investigation after conviction of a crime, and on applica-
tion for probation. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-8(3) (1981).
214. In re St. Louis, 67 Ill. 2d 43, 364 N.E.2d 61 (1977).
215. 54 I1. 2d 253, 296 N.E.2d 852 (1973).
216. Id at 257, 296 N.E.2d at 854.
-217. P.A. 82-0973 (1982), amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-10.
218. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
219. Id at 104-05.
220. 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
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ture of the minor. The United States Supreme Court held that the or-
der constituted a prior restraint such as was barred in Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart.22 Emphasizing that the name and picture were
"publicly revealed" and not unlawfully obtained, the Court concluded
that the order violated the first amendment. 222 The media is specifi-
cally authorized by statute to be present at Illinois juvenile
proceedings.223
The trend is clearly toward diminished juvenile court confidential-
ity. The legislature's 1982 amendments to section 702-8 through sec-
tion 702-10 make juvenile records accessible to many agencies for
many different purposes. Only extraordinary facts will permit juvenile
confidentiality, which is not a constitutionally protected right, 224 to out-
balance highly valued first amendment rights.
CONCLUSION
Today's juvenile court requires not only the "stalwart, protective,
and communicating figure," but also a judge who is versed in constitu-
tional and criminal law. Fulfilling responsibilities under these two
roles compels the judge to switch from one mental process to another
many times during his day in juvenile court. In his role as protector of
the best interests of the minor, it may become apparent to him that
certain services are necessary for the minor and the minor's family.
But the court does not have occasion to order the services when a mo-
tion to suppress is granted or the State fails to prove the minor respon-
sible beyond a reasonable doubt.
Though a culpable minor's "beating the system" undermines the
rehabilitative process, dismissal of his case may be required on consti-
tutional or evidentiary grounds. In this respect, post-Gault emphasis
upon guaranteeing due process rights has become a less than trusting
partner of the stated pre-Gault emphasis of benevolent concern and
protection. Often, the objectives of one orientation conflict with those
of the other.
221. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
222. 430 U.S. at 311-12.
223. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-20(6) (1981).
224. People v. Jiles, 43 111. 2d 145, 251 N.E.2d 529 (1969). The Illinois Supreme Court stated:
While there would probably be almost universal agreement that it is desirable for a State
to maintain a juvenile court and to establish special facilities for the treatment of a sepa-
rate category of 'juvenile delinquents,' we are aware of nothing in the constitution of the
United States or of this State that requires a State to do so.
Id at 148, 251 N.E.2d at 531. If access to a system of juvenile courts is not constitutionally
required, then, impliedly, the special protections offered by statutes enacting such systems, e.g.,
juvenile confidentiality, are not constitutionally preserved.
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The fifteen years since Gault have seen a balancing between infus-
ing due process rules into the juvenile court process to make it more
fair and less subject to abuse, and eschewing certain due process rules
that make it overly adversarial. The decisions regarding standard of
proof, pleadings, dispositions and double jeopardy demonstrate due
process has taken firm hold in juvenile court. The decisions regarding
bond, jury trial and public trial illustrate an effort to avoid "traditional
delay, formality, and the clamor of the adversary system" and continue
juvenile court as a workshop seeking to redirect and rehabilitate mi-
nors. The result is a hybrid requiring juvenile court to consider and
protect diverse rights.
The perception of juvenile court has changed dramatically from
the time of Gault to the present. The view of Justices Fortas and Doug-
las at the time of Gault was that juvenile court was at best an incompe-
tent bungler and at worst an oppressor of the juveniles whose rights it
was obliged to protect. More recently, the United States Supreme
Court in Fare commented that today's juvenile court is particularly
well equipped to protect the minor's rights in considering voluntariness
of confessions. The improvement in expertise often produces new criti-
cism that juvenile court is too protective of juvenile offenders.
Due process has likewise undergone many modifications in the
fifteen years since Gault. In 1966, Miranda v. Arizona 225 and Mapp v.
Ohio226 appeared to be at the forefront of further expansion of ac-
cuseds' rights. However, the passing of fifteen years has demonstrated
the narrowing and refining of those rights. The decisions pertaining to
confessions of minors reflect that direction. Gallegos v. Colorado and
Haley v. Ohio, cited prominently in Justice Fortas' opinion in Gault,
are more recently cited by the dissent in Fare.
The legislature's withdrawal of certain offenses from juvenile court
jurisdiction demonstrates that juvenile court is recognized as advanta-
geous to the minor and that its consequences are perceived as dispro-
portionate to the seriousness of the excluded offenses. Juvenile court
remains apart from class X and other determinate sentencing, save that
created under the special circumstances specified by the Habitual Juve-
nile Offender Act. The maximum loss of freedom continues to be to
age twenty-one. Many significant alternatives to incarceration have
been developed since Gault's challenge that juvenile court become gen-
uinely oriented toward rehabilitation as well as protective of due pro-
225. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
226. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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cess rights. As a result, little use is made of the juvenile's absolute right
to transfer his case to adult court. Were the Gault Court sitting today,
it might well recognize that juvenile court is presently the minor's best
choice for fair treatment and rehabilitation.
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